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We show several representation theorems for explanatory reasoning based on cumulative
models. An explanatory process is given by a binary relation  between formulas in
a propositional language where the intended meaning of α  γ is “γ is a preferred
explanation of α”. To each cumulative model E (a variation of those studied by Kraus,
Lehmann and Magidor) is associated an explanatory relation E . We show results of the
following type: An explanatory relation  satisﬁes certain logical postulates iff it coincides
with E for some cumulative model E of the appropriate type.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Explanatory reasoning is the process of inferring an explanation of an observation. In a logic-based approach to explana-
tory reasoning a background theory is given by a consistent set of formulas Σ in a propositional language which describes
the causal relations in the domain of application. A formula γ (consistent with Σ ) is said to be an explanation of α, if Σ
together with γ entails α.
The notion of explanation deﬁned in the previous paragraph has at least two limitations. On the one hand, an explanation
does not need to have, in general, a deductive connection with the observation. The link between them could reﬂect a more
complex structure. For instance, an explanation could include the beliefs (expectations, expertise etc.) of the reasoning
agent [6,14,23]. On the other hand, even if we restrict the attention to deductive explanations (as we are going to do in
this article), it is clear that explanations have different degrees of plausibility. Thus a characteristic feature of explanatory
reasoning (abduction) is the search for most plausible (simple, rational, preferred) explanations.
Despite the absent of a general deﬁnition of explanation, there have been several attempts to develop a logical account
of explanatory reasoning [1–5,7,10–12,20,22,23]. Some of these attempts have followed the so-called KLM methodology
developed by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor and many others for the study of consequence relations (see [16,18,19] and the
references therein). We recall some features of this approach in the next paragraphs.
We use binary relations  between formulas called preferred explanatory relations where α  γ is to be read as “γ
is a preferred explanation of α”. For the sake of brevity we will refer to  as an explanatory relation instead of using
the longer name of preferred explanatory relations. A ﬁrst feature of the KLM methodology consists in isolating a set of
rationality postulates for preferred explanatory relations. These postulates are regarded as the purely logical properties of
the reasoning process [12]. We will use the system of postulates introduced in [20,22]. Others systems for explanatory
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in this introduction.
For this article it is very important the heuristic used in [20,22] to isolate the postulates. Given an explanatory relation we associate to it the following consequence relation:
α |∼ β, if γ (together with Σ) entails β for each γ such that α  γ .
The relation α |∼ β is to be read as “when α is observed, then normally β is also present”. The analysis of |∼ through
the KLM methodology gave the initial intuition for the postulates for explanatory reasoning [20]. The intuition was that
the explanatory process encoded by a relation  is “rational” if its associated consequence relation |∼ has good struc-
tural properties according to the KLM hierarchy. Most of the postulates proposed using this heuristic are similar to those
introduced by Flach [10,11]. The results presented in [20,22] provides evidence of the (at least formal) correctness of the
postulates in the sense that these postulates allow to develop a theory about explanatory reasoning similar to the KLM
theory. The results in the present article provide more supporting evidence about this claim.
The KLM methodology has a second and very important component: the representation theorems. To explain what this
is we need to recall the notion of a model. A cumulative model [16] is a structure M = (S, i,≺) where S is set whose
elements are called states, i is a function from S into a set of valuations of the language and ≺ is a binary relation over S .
A state s ∈ S is said to satisfy a formula α, if every valuation in i(s) satisﬁes α. To each model it is associated a consequence
relation |∼M as follows:
α |∼M β, if l(s) satisﬁes β for every s which is ≺-minimal among all states that satisﬁes α.
A representation theorem for a system S of postulates is a result saying that a consequence relation satisﬁes all postulates
belonging to S if, and only if, it is of the form |∼M for a model M of a certain type.
In this paper we adapt the notion of a cumulative model to the context of explanatory reasoning and use those models
to show several representation theorems for explanatory relations. The idea is quite natural, a cumulative model is again a
triple E = (S, l,≺) but now l(s) is a set of formulas. We say that a state s ∈ S supports an observation α if Σ together with
γ entails α for every γ in l(s). Then E is deﬁned as:
α E γ , if γ belongs to l(s) for some s which is ≺-minimal among all states that support α.
We will show that the explanatory relations of the form E can be characterized by the rationality postulates introduced in
[20,22] (together with others introduced in this paper). To state more precisely our results, let us call an explanatory relation E-cumulative if |∼ is cumulative in the KLM sense. The notion of an E-preferential explanatory relation is analogously
deﬁned. The main results are roughly the following. An explanatory relation  is E-cumulative iff  is of the form E for a
cumulative model E . And  is E-preferential iff  is of the form E for a cumulative model E where the labeling function
l is such that l(s) contains only one formula (and satisﬁes another property to be introduced later).
One could think that these results are just straightforward corollaries of the corresponding representation theorems for
consequence relations. That is to say, suppose  is preferential, then it would be natural to expect that a KLM preferential
model for |∼ could be easily transformed into a model for . But the situation is quite the opposite. There are pairs
of completely different relations  and ∗ such that |∼ and |∼∗ are the same (see Example 3.7). On the other hand,
we show that for a large collection of consequence relations we can use our representation theorems to easily ﬁnd a KLM
model for them.
The results from [20,22] and the present work have made quite evident the especial role played by a single postulate
called Right Strengthening (RS):
if γ is a preferred explanation of α and γ ′ is a formula consistent with Σ such that γ ′ entails γ , then γ ′ is also a
preferred explanation of α.
This is a property with counterintuitive readings in the context of explanatory reasoning. For instance, if we want preferred
explanations to be syntactically simple (i.e. with a minimal number of propositional atoms), then we will not expect RS to
hold. RS sanctions preferred explanations which can include totally irrelevant facts (violating the principle of Ocam’s razor).
In fact, if γ is a preferred explanation of α and γ ∧a is consistent with Σ where a is just a literal, then under RS we would
have that γ ∧ a is also a preferred explanation of α, but it could happen that a has nothing to do with α. Moreover there
are many natural explanatory relations which do not satisfy RS (see [22]). On the other hand, RS is relevant for explaining
disjunctive observations (i.e. observations of the form α ∨ β) and is also related to situations where the preference criteria
for selecting explanations is a transitive relation [22].
One contribution of this paper is to show several representation theorems for relations not satisfying RS. For this end, we
introduce two principles weaker than RS which are more easily satisﬁed but nevertheless suﬃce to show our representation
theorems.
To end this introduction we will comment about previous works. This paper is a continuation of [20,22] but it is essen-
tially self-contained, nevertheless some familiarity with them will clearly provide the reader with a better overall picture of
the subject. In [22] was analyzed the situation where the labeling function l is injective and l(s) contains only one formula
for each s ∈ S . In this case, one can forget about the set S and work directly with a preference relation on the set of formu-
las. The distinction between injective and non-injective representations also occurs in the study of consequence relations.
The seminal KLM paper [16] dealt with the general case and Freund [13] studied the injective case (see also [21,24,25]).
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he analyzed a system, denoted by EM, of postulates for explanatory induction. One of his main results states that EM is
represented by the so-called strong explanatory structures. In our terminology, these structures are cumulative models
where ≺ is the empty relation. The reason for this extreme situation is the following. The system EM includes a rule named
Converse entailment which is a variant of the following rule:
if γ is a preferred explanation of α and α entails β, then γ is also a preferred explanation of β
(we call it full explanatory cut). When an explanatory relation satisﬁes full explanatory cut, then the explanatory relation
is represented by an injective cumulative model with ≺ the empty relation [22, Proposition 5.14]. This explains why the
semantic for EM found by Flach does not use a preference relation between states. A similar comment is valid for the work
of Bochman [4,5] who uses a rule called Weakening rule which corresponds to our full explanatory cut. In [20] two others
(weaker) cut rules were introduced. Cut rules are tightly related to the selection mechanism behind preferred explanations
and they can be regarded as the formal counterpart of selection criteria [22].
In the concluding remarks of [10] was left as an open problem to ﬁnd a “characterization of explanatory induction with
respect to weaker (e.g. preferential) explanation mechanisms”. An answer to this question follows from the results in [23]
for the case when the preference mechanism is a total-preoder (i.e. the so-called ranked models). Our results provide an
alternative answer. Flach also studied the related but different notion of conﬁrmatory induction and proved a representation
theorem for it [10].
Walliser et al. [23] presented a characterization of explanatory processes based on belief revision. They proposed a
notion of explanation that differs substantially from ours since for them an explanation does not need to (logically) entail
the observation and this will be one of our basic postulates. A similar notion was studied by Boutilier and Becher [6]. We
will comment about this approach in Section 2.3.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the basic notions, recall the postulates for consequence and
explanatory relations and show some facts about the postulates we need in the sequel. In Section 3 we recall the underlying
heuristic used for isolating the postulates for explanatory relations and show how this heuristic leads to a duality between
explanatory relations and consequence relations. In Section 4 we introduce the cumulative models. In Section 5 we show
the soundness of these models and in Section 6 we complete the proofs of the representation theorems. In Section 7 we
show how to get some representation theorems for consequence relations from the results presented in this paper. Finally
in Section 8 we make some concluding remarks.
2. Preliminaries
In this section we introduce the terminology and some deﬁnitions about consequence and explanatory relations as
presented by Kraus, Lehmann and Magidor [16] and Pino-Pérez and Uzcátegui [20,22]. We also establish some basic facts
about explanatory relations which will be needed in the sequel.
We will work with a classical propositional language. The classical consequence relation is denoted by 	. If Γ is a set of
formulas, then Cn(Γ ) denotes the set of all classical consequences of Γ . As usual 
 and ⊥ denote respectively the formulas
true and false. A model of a set of formulas Γ is a valuation M of the language that gives the value 1 to each formula
in Γ . We write M | α if M is a model of {α}. A collection of formulas is consistent if it has a model.
The background theory describing the causal relations of the domain of application is a consistent set of formulas Σ . The
collection of formulas consistent with Σ is denoted by FormΣ . We write α 	Σ β when Σ ∪ {α} 	 β . The set of valuations
satisfying Σ ∪ {α} is denoted by mod(α).
2.1. Nonmonotonic consequence relations
A consequence relation is a binary relation |∼ between formulas on a classical propositional language. If α and β are
formulas, then the pair α |∼β is read: “if α holds, then normally β holds”, or “β is a plausible consequence of α”.
The basic rationality postulates for consequence relations as presented in [16] are the following.
REF α |∼α
LLE If α |∼β and 	 α ↔ γ , then γ |∼β
RW If α |∼β and 	 β → γ , then α |∼γ
CUT If α ∧ β |∼γ and α |∼β , then α |∼γ
CM If α |∼β and α |∼γ , then α ∧ β |∼γ
OR If α |∼γ and β |∼γ , then α ∨ β |∼γ
The abbreviations above are read as follows: (REF) reﬂexivity, (LLE) left logical equivalence, (RW) Right weakening and
(CM) cautious monotony. CUT and OR are self-explanatory.
Now we recall a basic classiﬁcation scheme of consequence relations as presented in [16].
Deﬁnition 2.1. A consequence relation |∼ is said to be cumulative if it satisﬁes REF, LLE, RW, CUTand CM. The relation |∼
is said to be preferential if it is cumulative and satisﬁes the rule OR.
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C|∼(α) = {θ : α |∼ θ}.
If there is no ambiguity we will write C(α) instead of C|∼(α).
Since Σ describes the causal relations of the domain of application, the following deﬁnition taken from [20] is very
natural when dealing with explanatory reasoning.
Deﬁnition 2.2. A consequence relation |∼ satisfying REF is said to be adequate with respect to Σ if the following holds: for
every formula α
C(α) =
⋂{
Cn
(
Σ ∪ {γ }): C(α) ⊆ Cn(Σ ∪ {γ })}.
If there is no danger of confusion we will just say adequate instead of adequate with respect to Σ .
2.2. Explanatory relations
Given α ∈ FormΣ , the collection of explanations of α with respect to Σ is denoted by Expla(α) and is deﬁned as follows:
Expla(α) = {γ ∈ FormΣ : γ 	Σ α}.
Expla(α) contains all possible explanations of α and from this set the preferred explanations will be selected. In particular,
we have ruled out trivial formulas by requiring that an explanation has to be a formula consistent with Σ . An explanatory
relation is deﬁned as a subset of {(α,γ ): γ ∈ Expla(α)}.
Deﬁnition 2.3. An explanatory relation for Σ will be any binary relation  over FormΣ such that
if α  γ , then γ 	Σ α. (1)
We read α  γ as “γ is a preferred explanation of α (with respect to Σ )”.
Condition (1) says that we are using deduction as the basic explanatory mechanisms. Thus we could have given to our
relations a more informative name as deductive explanatory relations. We will come back to this issue later in Section 2.3.
Example 2.4. We introduce for later reference an extreme example: reverse deduction.
α rd γ def⇔ γ 	Σ α&γ 	Σ ⊥ .
Thus, by deﬁnition, every explanatory relation  satisﬁes
⊆rd.
Now we recall some of the structural properties of explanatory relations as presented in [20]. In Section 3 we will recall
the heuristic used to isolate this postulates.
E-CM If α  γ and for all δ [α  δ ⇒ δ 	Σ β], then (α ∧ β) γ
E-S-CM If α  γ and γ 	Σ β , then (α ∧ β) γ
E-C-Cut If (α ∧ β) γ and for all δ [α  δ ⇒ δ 	Σ β], then α  γ
LLEΣ If 	Σ α ↔ α′ and α  γ , then α′  γ
E-ConΣ If  	Σ ¬α, then there is γ such that α  γ
The names of the postulates are, respectively, Explanatory cautious monotony, Explanatory strong cautious monotony, Ex-
planatory cautious cut, Left Logical Equivalence and Explanatory consistency preservation. Notice that E-S-CM implies E-CM.1
Other postulates used in this paper are the following:
RS If α  γ , γ ′ 	Σ γ and γ ′ 	Σ ⊥, then α  γ ′
RLEΣ If 	Σ γ ↔ γ ′ and α  γ , then α  γ ′
LOR− Suppose α,β ∈ FormΣ . If (α ∨ β) γ , then there are δi and ρ j such that α  δi and β  ρ j and γ 	Σ δ1 ∨ · · · ∨
δn ∨ ρ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ρm
ROR If α  γ and α  δ, then α  (γ ∨ δ)
SC If β  δ&δ 	Σ α&α  δ, then there is ρ such that α  ρ , ρ 	Σ β and (ρ ∨ β) ρ
1 In [20,22] E-S-CM was denoted E-CM.
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left, ROR is an introduction rule for disjunctions on the right and SC stands for Strengthened Cumulativity.
Now we recall a classiﬁcation scheme for explanatory relations introduced in [20,22] and which is analogous to that
given in Deﬁnition 2.1. A justiﬁcation for the names in this hierarchy will be given in Section 3.
Deﬁnition 2.5. An explanatory relation is called E-cumulative when it satisﬁes E-CM, E-C-Cut, LLEΣ and E-ConΣ . It is
called E-S-cumulative when it satisﬁes E-S-CM, E-C-Cut, LLEΣ and E-ConΣ and E-preferential when it is E-S-cumulative and
satisﬁes LOR−.2
Postulates SC is a technical condition which is needed for the proof of a representation theorem. The following proposi-
tion shows the connection of SC with the other postulates. Its easy proof is left to the reader.
Proposition 2.6. Let  be an explanatory relation satisfying LLEΣ and E-ConΣ . The following are equivalent.
(i)  satisﬁes E-S-CM and E-C-Cut.
(ii) For every α,β ∈ FormΣ , if β  δ, δ 	Σ α and α  δ, then there is ρ such that α  ρ and ρ 	Σ β .
In particular, if  satisﬁes LLEΣ , E-ConΣ and SC, then  is E-S-cumulative.
As we have explained in the introduction, RS is a controversial postulate. However, two of its consequences, which are
much easily satisﬁed, suﬃce for the proof of the representation theorems.
Lemma 2.7. Suppose  is E-S-cumulative and satisﬁes RS, then SC and LOR− hold.
Proof. We will show ﬁrst that SC holds. Suppose that β  δ, δ 	Σ α and α  δ. Then α ∨ β  δ, otherwise by E-S-CM we
have (α ∨ β)∧ α  δ and by LLEΣ we get that α  δ which is not possible. On the other hand, from E-S-CM we have
(α ∨ β) ∧ β  δ. Therefore by E-C-Cut there is γ such that (α ∨ β) γ and γ 	Σ β . Thus γ ∧¬β is consistent with Σ . Put
ρ = γ ∧ ¬β . By RS, α ∨ β  ρ . Since ρ 	Σ α and ρ 	Σ ρ ∨ β , then by E-S-CM and LLEΣ we conclude that α  ρ and
ρ ∨ β  ρ .
Now we will show that LOR− holds. Let α, β and γ in FormΣ be such that α ∨ β  γ . If γ 	Σ α or γ 	Σ β , then
by E-S-CM and LLEΣ it is clear that α  γ or β  γ and there is nothing to show. Thus we assume that γ ∧ α and
γ ∧ β are consistent with Σ . By RS we have α ∨ β  α ∧ γ and α ∨ β  β ∧ γ . By E-S-CM then α ∧ (α ∨ β)  γ ∧ α,
β ∧ (α ∨ β) γ ∧ β . Thus by LLEΣ we get α  α ∧ γ and β  β ∧ γ . Since γ 	Σ (α ∧ γ )∨ (β ∧ γ ), we are done. 
We present now some examples of explanatory relations and refer the reader to [22] where many more examples are
studied with details. In particular, all the examples we present below are E-S-cumulative (see [22]).
The example that follows is particularly interesting since it is an explanatory relation that satisﬁes LOR− and SC but, in
a very strong sense, is syntax dependent on the right-hand side, thus it does not satisfy RS. Moreover, it uses a very natural
simplicity criteria for selecting the preferred explanations [17].
Example 2.8. For this example we assume Σ to be empty. A literal is an atom or a negation of an atom. Let C be the set of
all formulas that are conjunctions of literals (without repetitions) together with 
 and ⊥. Deﬁne a partial order ≺lit on C
as follows:
γ ≺lit δ def⇔ δ 	 γ&γ 	 δ.
Let lit be deﬁned by
α lit γ def⇔ γ ∈min(Expla(α)∩ C,≺lit).
In other word, α lit γ if γ is a prime implicant of α.
We will show that lit satisﬁes SC. In fact, suppose β lit γ , γ 	 α and α lit γ . By the deﬁnition of ≺lit there is δ ∈ C
such that γ 	 δ and α lit δ. It suﬃces to show that (δ ∨ β)lit δ. Suppose not, then there is ρ ∈ C such that δ 	 ρ and
(δ ∨ β)lit ρ and ρ 	 δ. There are η, ξ ∈ C and a literal l such that δ = ρ ∧ l ∧ η and γ = ρ ∧ l ∧ η ∧ ξ . As ρ ∧ ¬l 	 ¬δ and
ρ 	 δ ∨ β , then ρ ∧¬l 	 β . Since γ 	 β , then ρ ∧ η ∧ ξ 	 β and this contradicts that β lit γ .
This relation also satisﬁes LOR−, this can be proved directly as we did for SCbut we postpone its proof for later (see
Remark 3.8).
2 In [20,22] E-preferential relations are supposed to satisfy RS, we have weakened this requirement to LOR− (see Lemma 2.7).
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consider  a strict partial order over mod(Σ). Recall that mod(α) denotes the set of models of Σ ∪ {α}. Deﬁne the notion
of a minimal model of a formula α as follows
min(α) = {N ∈mod(Σ): M |α for all M  N}.
Let c be deﬁned by
α c γ def⇔ mod(γ ) ⊆min(α).
Relations of the form c are the typical relations satisfying RS, ROR and LOR−.
There are some variants of c which are interesting. A subset A of mod(Σ) is called an -antichain (or just an antichain)
if the models in A are mutually -incomparable. For example, min(α) is a antichain for every formula α. In fact, min(α)
is a maximal antichain of mod(α), i.e. if min(α) ⊆ A ⊆ mod(α) and A is an antichain, then A = min(α). We deﬁne a new
relation as follows:
α ma γ def⇔ mod(γ ) is a maximal antichain of mod(α).
It is not diﬃcult to show that ma satisﬁes SC and LOR− but in general does not satisfy RS. A variation of ma is
α mac γ def⇔ mod(γ ) is an antichain of mod(α) of maximal cardinality.
In most cases mac does not satisfy neither LOR− nor SC. However, there is a choice of  such that mac satisﬁes LOR−
but not SCand also there is  such that mac satisﬁes SC but not LOR−. For example, let Σ be a theory with four models
M , N , S and T and let  be the following order:
Then mac satisﬁes LOR− but not SC. On the other hand, if  is the following order,
then mac satisﬁes SC but not LOR−. In particular, this shows that under the postulates of E-S-cumulativity LOR− and SC
are independent postulates.
2.3. An alternative approach
Before we continue with the main objective of this paper, we would like to comment about some alternative methods to
deﬁne a notion of an explanation. We hope that these comments will help the reader to place our work in a more general
context.
Most presentations of abduction assume that an observation must be inferred, in some way, from any of its abduced
explanations. In this paper we are using classical deduction as the inference mechanism, so our explanatory relations, by
deﬁnition, have the property that when α  γ , then γ 	Σ α. We will make some brief comments about the alternative
approach of replacing 	Σ by a more general consequence relation.
For the rest of this section, |∼ is a ﬁxed consequence relation which we assume to be reﬂexive and Σ-supraclassical
(i.e. if α 	Σ β , then α |∼β). There are three notions of explanation naturally associated to it [20,23]. In the following γ is
assumed to be consistent with Σ .
epistemic explanation α |<e γ if γ |∼α.
strong epistemic explanation α |<se γ if C(α) ⊆ C(γ ).
causal explanation α |∼ γ if C(α) ⊆ Cn(Σ ∪ {γ }).
Recall that rd denotes the reverse classical deduction (see Example 2.4). The following obvious fact shows the interde-
pendence between these four notions:
rd|∼ ⊆ ⊆ |<e
|<
.se
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satisfy the following:
if α |<γ , then γ |∼α.
This property aﬃrms that explanatory reasoning is subsumed by reversed nonmonotonic reasoning.
The notions of epistemic and strong epistemic explanation have applications specially in contexts where an explanation
does not necessarily entail the observation [6]. When |∼ is a rational consequence relation, |<e and |<se are very interesting
due to the well known connection between the AGM theory of belief revision and nonmonotonic logic [15]. The interpre-
tation of these relations in terms of belief revision makes them very appealing. In [23] is given a complete characterization
of |<se when |∼ is a rational consequence relation but the more general question of ﬁnding postulates to characterize |<se
when |∼ is just preferential was left open. In [10], |<se was called the explanatory consequence relation associate to |∼. Both
papers [10,23] propose |<se as a good deﬁnition of abduction. In [20], relations of the form |∼ were called causal and were
completely characterized in terms of postulates.
It is important to realize that the relations |∼ , |<e and |<se are three different ways of interpreting abduction as
nonmonotonic reasoning in the reverse. We are not arguing in favor of any speciﬁc form of explanatory reasoning. Instead,
we are interested in the issue of representing relations by some natural mathematical structure. More speciﬁcally, in this
article we will focus on the representation of relations contained in rd but quite different from |∼ .
3. The underlying heuristic
In this section we present the heuristic behind the postulates which was originally developed in [20].
3.1. The abductive consequence relation |∼
Recall that to each explanatory relation  we have associated a consequence relation |∼ as follows:
α |∼ β, if γ 	Σ β for each γ such that α  γ .
We read α |∼ β as “when α is observed, then β is normally also present”. This abductive consequence relation was intro-
duced in [20]. It allows to switch from the explanations of an observation to its abductive consequences and thus it provides
a bridge between explanatory reasoning and nonmonotonic reasoning. This type of relations are named Scott consequence
relations in [4,5].
On the other hand, to each consequence relation |∼ we associate an explanatory relation as follows: let γ be a formula
consistent with Σ .
α |∼ γ def⇔ C(α) ⊆ Cn(Σ ∪ {γ }).
The initial intuition for the postulates for explanatory relation listed in Section 2.2 came from an analysis of |∼ and |∼ .
Some of the postulates can be rewritten in terms of |∼ as follows:
E-CM If α  γ and α |∼ β , then (α ∧ β) γ
E-C-Cut If (α ∧ β) γ and α |∼ β , then α  γ
From this it is easy to check that |∼ satisﬁes Cut if, and only if, |∼ satisﬁes E-CM.
The propositions that follow illustrate very well the interplay between , |∼ and |∼ . They will be needed in the
sequel. The proof of the ﬁrst one is straightforward and is left to the reader.
Proposition 3.1. Let  be an E-cumulative explanatory relation and α,β formulas. The following are equivalent:
(i) α |∼ β and β |∼ α.
(ii) For all γ , α  γ iff β  γ .
Since α |∼ α ∨ β holds for all α and β , then from the previous result we immediately get the following proposition.
Proposition 3.2. Let  be an E-cumulative explanatory relation. Suppose α ∨ β |∼ α. Then α  γ iff α ∨ β  γ for all γ .
Proposition 3.3. Suppose  satisﬁes E-S-CM and LLEΣ .
(i) If  satisﬁes LOR−, then |∼ satisﬁes the rule OR.
(ii) If the language is ﬁnite and |∼ satisﬁes OR, then  satisﬁes LOR−.
3 The symbol |< was used by Flach [10].
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α ∨ β  γ . If α is not consistent with Σ , then by LLEΣ , β  γ and thus γ 	Σ θ . Analogously, if β is not consistent with
Σ , then γ 	Σ θ . Finally, if α,β ∈ FormΣ , then it follows immediately from LOR− that γ 	Σ θ .
(ii) Suppose the language is ﬁnite and |∼ satisﬁes OR. Let α,β ∈ FormΣ . Since the language is ﬁnite there are formulas
δi and ρ j for 1  i  n and 1  j  m such that (i) α  δi and β  ρ j for all i and j, (ii) for each η, if α  η, then
η 	Σ δ1 ∨ · · · ∨ δn and (iii) for each η, if β  η, then η 	Σ ρ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ρm . From this it follows that
α |∼ δ1 ∨ · · · ∨ δn ∨ ρ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ρm and β |∼ δ1 ∨ · · · ∨ δn ∨ ρ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ρm.
Since |∼ satisﬁes OR, then
α ∨ β |∼ δ1 ∨ · · · ∨ δn ∨ ρ1 ∨ · · · ∨ ρm.
From this it is obvious that LOR− holds. 
The following theorem justiﬁes our choice of terminology and is a ﬁrst indication of a duality between explanatory and
consequence relations.
Theorem 3.4. Let  be an explanatory relation and |∼ be a consequence relation adequate with respect to Σ .
(i) If  is E-cumulative, then |∼ is cumulative and adequate w.r.t. Σ .
(ii) If  is E-preferential, then |∼ is preferential and adequate w.r.t. Σ .
(iii) If |∼ is cumulative, then|∼ is E-cumulative and satisﬁes RS.
(iv) If |∼ is preferential, then |∼ is E-preferential and satisﬁes RS.
Proof. Parts (i) and (iii) were proved in [20]. Part (ii) follows from part (i) and Proposition 3.3. To see part (iv), we recall
that when |∼ is preferential, then |∼ satisﬁes E-S-CM (see [20]). From this, part (iii) and Lemma 2.7 the result follows. 
We end this section by showing a lemma that will be needed in the sequel. It follows from the results in [16], we present
its proof for the sake of completeness.
Lemma 3.5. Let  be an E-S-cumulative explanatory relation that satisﬁes LOR−. Suppose α ∨ β |∼ α and β ∨ η |∼ β , then α ∨
β ∨ η |∼ α and α ∨ η |∼ α.
Proof. From Theorem 3.4 we know that |∼ is a preferential consequence relation. First we show that α ∨ β ∨ η |∼ α ∨ β .
Since β ∨η |∼ β , then β ∨η |∼ α∨β and clearly α∨β |∼ α∨β . Therefore, as |∼ satisﬁes OR then α∨β ∨η |∼ α∨β .
Now as α ∨ β |∼ α and α ∨ β |∼ α ∨ β ∨ η, then it follows easily from Proposition 3.1 that α ∨ β ∨ η |∼ α. Thus α ∨ β ∨
η |∼ α ∨ η and clearly α ∨ η |∼ α ∨ β ∨ η. Hence, again by Proposition 3.1, we easily conclude that α ∨ η |∼ α. 
3.2. A duality between|∼ and |∼
To better understand the duality between explanatory and consequence relations we consider the following maps:
Φ(|∼) =|∼,
Ψ () = |∼.
The following result (taken from [8,20]) summarizes the main properties of these mappings.
Proposition 3.6. Let |∼ be a consequence relation and  an explanatory relation. Then
1. |∼ ⊆ Ψ (Φ(|∼)).
2. ⊆ Φ(Ψ ()).
3. Ψ () is adequate.
4. Φ(Ψ (Φ(|∼))) = Φ(|∼).
5. Ψ (Φ(Ψ ())) = Ψ ().
It is easy to verify that (Ψ ◦ Φ)(|∼) = |∼ for every adequate consequence relation. On the other hand, an explanatory
relation  is called causal if (Φ ◦Ψ )() = [20]. This is a very special class of explanatory relations. A causal explanatory
relation  is completely determined by |∼ . Part 4 of the above proposition says that |∼ is causal for every consequence
relation |∼. The relations of the form c given in Example 2.9 are the typical examples of causal relations. For ﬁnite
language, a relation is causal iff it satisﬁes RS and ROR [20].
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of each other. However, this is not the case as Ψ is not injective. We give below two quite disparate explanatory relations and ∗ such that Ψ () = Ψ (∗).
In spite of these limiting aspects, |∼ brings very useful information for the study of .
Example 3.7 (Three explanatory relations which have associated the same abductive consequence relation). For this example Σ is
empty and the language is ﬁnite. Fix a partial order  on the valuations of the language and consider the relations lit ,ma , and rd (see Examples 2.4, 2.8 and 2.9). We claim that
Ψ (ma) = Ψ (lit) = Ψ (rd) =	 .
For notational simplicity, let |∼ lit be Ψ (lit), |∼ma be Ψ (ma) and |∼ rd be Ψ (rd). First of all, notice that to show that
Ψ () =	 it suﬃces that Ψ () ⊆	.
For rd , let us notice that α rd α for all consistent α. Thus if α |∼ rd β , then necessarily α 	 β .
For lit , let α |∼ lit β and we will show that α 	 β . This follows immediately from the fact that every formula is equivalent
to the disjunction of all its prime implicant. We provide a proof for the sake of completeness. Let M be a model of α. We
will show that M | β . Let δM be the conjunction of all literals that holds in M . Then by the deﬁnition of ≺lit it is clear that
there is γ ∈ C such that δM 	 γ 	 α and γ is ≺lit-minimal. Thus by the deﬁnition of lit we have α lit γ . Since α |∼ lit β ,
then γ 	 β . Since M is a model of γ , we are done.
Finally, for ma , suppose α |∼ma β . Let M | α. Then there is a maximal -antichain A ⊆mod(α) containing M . Let γ be
a formula whose models are the valuation in A. Then by the deﬁnition of ma we have α ma γ and thus γ 	 β . Therefore
M | β .
Remark 3.8. It follows from Proposition 3.3 that lit , ma , and rd satisﬁes LOR−.
4. Models for explanatory relations
In this section we introduce the notion of cumulative models for explanatory reasoning. It is a variant of the original
deﬁnition given in [16] which ﬁts naturally in the context of explanatory reasoning.
Deﬁnition 4.1. A preference relation ≺ over a set S will be a irreﬂexive binary relation over S . Given A ⊆ S , we say that b is
≺-minimal (or just minimal) in A if b ∈ A and there is no a ∈ A with a ≺ b. The set of minimal elements of A is denoted by
min(A,≺) (or just min(A) when there is no danger of confusion).
Deﬁnition 4.2. A model is a triple E = 〈S, l,≺〉 where S is a set, l is a function from S into the collection of nonempty
subsets of FormΣ and ≺ is a preference relation over S . For each formula α, let
αˆ = {s ∈ S: γ 	Σ α for all γ ∈ l(s)}.
To each model E = 〈S, l,≺〉 is associated an explanatory relation and a consequence relation as follows
α E γ def⇔ ∃s ∈min(αˆ,≺) (γ ∈ l(s)) (2)
α |∼E β def⇔ ∀s ∈min(αˆ,≺)
(
l(s) 	Σ β
)
. (3)
When l(s) contains only one element, E is called a single valued model and, in this case, we assume that l(s) ∈ FormΣ . When
the relation ≺ is transitive we say that the model E is transitive.
Before we continue, we would like to make some comments about a difference between our models and the original
deﬁnition given in [16]. In that paper, a model M is a triple (S, i,≺) where S is a set of possible states (“they represent
possible states of affairs, including perhaps the state of mind or knowledge of the reasoner” [16]), each state s is labeled
with a set i(s) of valuations (“the set of worlds the reasoner thinks are possible at this state” [16]) and ≺ is a preference
relation over S . In this context, αˆ denotes the set of all states s such that every valuation in i(s) satisﬁes α. An inference
relation associated to the model M is deﬁned by
α |∼M β def⇔ ∀s ∈min(αˆ,≺)
(
i(s) ⊆mod(β)).
Notice that |∼M = |∼E if we take i(s) to be mod(l(s)).
Since the valuations in i(s) for s ∈ min(αˆ,≺) are regarded as the most likely “worlds” where α holds, then the relation
α |∼M β is read as “α normally implies β”. Under this interpretation it is then natural to consider that a formula γ is a
preferred explanation of α if every valuation satisfying γ is a minimal world for α, that is to say, if the following holds:
mod(γ ) ⊆ i(s) for some s ∈min(αˆ,≺). (4)
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RS. And as we said in the introduction, RS is a controversial postulate and there are many natural examples of explanatory
relations not satisfying it (see [22]). Moreover, if the language is inﬁnite it is not obvious when there would be a γ satisfying
(4). In addition to that, we cannot expect to associate an explanatory relation to a model in a way that depends only on
the valuations in i(s). This is because the explanatory relation would satisfy RLEΣ regardless of the model used and this
will rule out explanatory relations that are syntax dependent on the right (notice that RLEΣ follows from RS). All these
considerations say that the deﬁnition given in (2) is more general than (4).
Now we go back to our discussion about the explanatory relation associated to a model. The deﬁnition of E will make
sense if there are plenty of minimal elements. The next deﬁnition deals with this issue.
Deﬁnition 4.3. (See [16].) Let ≺ be a preference relation over S . We say that a subset A of S is smooth (with respect to ≺)
if for every a ∈ A either a is minimal in A or there is b ∈ A with b ≺ a and b minimal in A.
For instance, if S is ﬁnite and ≺ is a partial order, then every subset of S is smooth. Notice that in a model E = 〈S, l,≺〉
the notion of a smooth set does not depend on the labeling function l. We introduce now a new deﬁnition which depends
on l and which turns out to be the right notion for representing E-cumulative relations.
Deﬁnition 4.4. Given a model E = 〈S, l,≺〉, we say that A ⊆ S is l-smooth is the following holds: For every s ∈ A there is
t ∈min(A) such that l(s) = l(t) or t ≺ s.
Let
lmin(αˆ) = {s ∈ S: ∃t ∈min(αˆ)l(s) = l(t)}.
Notice that αˆ is l-smooth, if for all s ∈ αˆ, then s ∈ lmin(αˆ) or there is t ∈ min(α̂) with t ≺ s. Also notice that s ∈ lmin(αˆ) iff
α E l(s).
Now we introduce the models used for giving a semantic to explanatory relations.
Deﬁnition 4.5. A model E = 〈S, l,≺〉 is a cumulative model if αˆ is smooth and nonempty for every α ∈ FormΣ . We say that
E is a cumulative l-model if αˆ is nonempty and l-smooth for every α ∈ FormΣ
Notice that every cumulative model is clearly a l-model but not viceversa as we show in the following.
Example 4.6 (A single valued cumulative l-model which is not cumulative model and its associated explanatory relation cannot be
represented by a single valued cumulative model.). Let N , M , P and Q be different valuations in a ﬁnite language. Let Σ be
the theory whose models are N , M , P and Q . Pick formulas γM , γN , γP and γQ with a unique model, namely, M , N , P and
Q respectively. We deﬁne a model as follows. The set S contains six states s1, s2, s3, s4, s5 and s6. The labeling function
l is given by l(s1) = γP , l(s2) = γN , l(s3) = γN ∨ γP ∨ γQ , l(s4) = l(s6) = γM and l(s5) = γQ . Finally, the preference relation
among the states is the following: s1 ≺ s2, s2 ≺ s4, s3 ≺ s4 and s5 ≺ s6. In particular notice that s1 ≺ s4.
To check that this model is a cumulative l-model, consider α ∈ FormΣ . Since for all V ∈mod(Σ) there exists s ∈ S such that
l(s) = γV , then αˆ is nonempty. Now we will prove that αˆ is l-smooth. Suppose that there is s ∈ αˆ such that s /∈min(αˆ). Then
s ∈ {s2, s4, s6}. If s = s2, then s1 ∈min(αˆ) and s1 ≺ s. If s = s6, then s5 ∈min(αˆ) and s5 ≺ s. Finally, if s = s4, we consider two
cases: (i) Q |α. Then s6 ∈min(αˆ) and l(s6) = l(s4). (ii) Q | α. Then s3 ∈min(αˆ) and s3 ≺ s.
However, it is not a cumulative model since αˆ is not smooth for α = γM ∨ γN ∨ γP . In fact, s4 ∈ αˆ, but there is no
t ∈min(αˆ,≺) such that t ≺ s4. Notice that this does not contradict the l-smoothness of αˆ as s6 ∈min(αˆ,≺) and l(s4) = l(s6).
In the following, for notational convenience, we will write α̂ instead of αˆ. Let  be the explanatory relation associated
to this model. We claim that  cannot be represented by a single valued cumulative model. Suppose to the contrary that
there exists a cumulative single valued model E = 〈T ,h,〉 such that E = . Since (γM ∨ γP ∨ γQ )  γM , there exists
s ∈min((γM ∨ γP ∨ γQ )̂ ,) such that h(s) = γM . We have s ∈ (γM ∨ γN ∨ γQ )̂ and γM ∨ γN ∨ γQ have only two preferred
explanations, namely, γN and γQ . Hence there is t ∈ min((γM ∨ γN ∨ γQ )̂ ,) such that t  s and either h(t) = γN or
h(t) = γQ . But s ∈ min((γM ∨ γP ∨ γQ )̂ ,), thus h(t) = γN . In particular, s /∈ min((γM ∨ γN ∨ γP )̂ ,). Therefore there is
r ∈ min((γM ∨ γN ∨ γP )̂ ,) such that r  s. But γM ∨ γN ∨ γP have only two preferred explanations, namely, γM and γP .
Hence either h(r) = γM or h(r) = γP . But this contradicts that s ∈min((γM ∨ γP ∨ γQ )̂ ,).
Now we introduce three properties of a model. They are the counterpart of LOR−, SC and RS.
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there are states ti ∈min(αˆ) (i = 1, . . . ,n) and r j ∈min(βˆ) ( j = 1, . . . ,m) such that
l(s) 	Σ l(t1)∨ · · · ∨ l(tn)∨ l(r1)∨ · · · ∨ l(rm).
Deﬁnition 4.8. A single valued model E = 〈S, l,≺〉 is said to have property S if given α,β ∈ FormΣ and s ∈min(βˆ)∩ αˆ, then
s ∈ lmin(αˆ) or there are states s′ and t such that s′ ∈min(βˆ), l(s) = l(s′), t ≺ s′ , t ∈ lmin(αˆ)∩ lmin(̂β ∨ l(t)).
s s′ ∈min(βˆ)
|
t ∈ lmin(αˆ)∩ lmin(̂β ∨ l(t))
Deﬁnition 4.9. A single valued cumulative model E = 〈S, l,≺〉 is said to have property P if for all s ∈ S and γ ∈ Expla(l(s))
there exists s′ such that γ = l(s′) and t ≺ s for every t with t ≺ s′ .
5. Soundness of the models
In this section we show that our models are sound.
Theorem 5.1. Let E = 〈S, l,≺〉 be a cumulative l-model. Then E is E-cumulative.
Proof. To simplify the notation let us denote  by E . Let α ∈ FormΣ . By hypothesis αˆ = ∅ and since αˆ is l-smooth, there
is t ∈min(αˆ). Thus E-ConΣ is satisﬁed.
To see that E-C-Cut holds, suppose α ∧ β  γ and α |∼ β . Let s ∈ min(̂α ∧ β) be such that γ ∈ l(s). Since s ∈ αˆ, then
there is t ∈min(αˆ) such that l(s) = l(t) or t ≺ s. As α |∼ β we have t ∈̂α ∧ β . Hence t ≺ s, as s ∈min(̂α ∧ β). Thus l(s) = l(t)
and α  γ .
Finally, we verify that E-CM holds. Suppose α  γ and α |∼ β . Let s ∈ min(αˆ) be such that γ ∈ l(s). Since α |∼ β we
have s ∈̂α ∧ β . By the l-smoothness of̂α ∧ β there is t ∈ min(̂α ∧ β) such that l(s) = l(t) or t ≺ s. But t ≺ s as s ∈ min(αˆ).
Therefore l(s) = l(t) and α ∧ β  γ . 
Theorem 5.2. If E is a cumulative single valued l-model, thenE is E-S-cumulative.
Proof. By Theorem 5.1 we only need to verify that E-S-CM holds. Suppose αE γ and γ 	Σ β . Let s ∈min(αˆ) be such that
l(s) = γ . Thus s ∈̂α ∧ β . By the l-smoothness of̂α ∧ β there is t ∈ min(̂α ∧ β) such that l(s) = l(t) or t ≺ s. In particular,
t ∈ αˆ, thus t ≺s and hence l(s) = l(t) = γ . Therefore α ∧ β E γ . 
The following proposition show the soundness of some properties introduced in the previous section.
Proposition 5.3. Let E = 〈S, l,≺〉 be a single valued model.
(i) If E = 〈S, l,≺〉 has property O, thenE satisﬁes LOR−.
(ii) If E = 〈S, l,≺〉 has property S, then E satisﬁes SC.
(iii) If E = 〈S, l,≺〉 has property P, then E satisﬁes RS.
Proof. (i) It is immediate from the deﬁnition of E and the property O. Consider α ∨ β E γ with α, β and γ in FormΣ .
There exists s ∈ min(̂α ∨ β) such that l(s) = γ . By the property O there are states ti ∈ min(αˆ) (i = 1, . . . ,n) and r j ∈ min(βˆ)
( j = 1, . . . ,m) such that
l(s) 	Σ l(t1)∨ · · · ∨ l(tn)∨ l(r1)∨ · · · ∨ l(rm).
Then α E l(ti) for (i = 1, . . . ,n), β E l(r j) for ( j = 1, . . . ,m) and we see that E satisﬁes LOR−.
(ii) Suppose β E δ, δ 	Σ α and α E δ. Then there is s ∈ S such that s ∈ min(βˆ) ∩ αˆ with l(s) = δ. Clearly s /∈ lmin(αˆ),
thus by property S, there are s′, t ∈ S such that t ≺ s′ , s′ ∈min(βˆ), l(s) = l(s′), t ∈ lmin(αˆ) and t ∈ lmin(̂β ∨ l(t)). Let γ = l(t),
then α E γ , (γ ∨ β)E γ and γ 	Σ β as s′ ∈min(βˆ).
(iii) Suppose α E γ and γ ′ ∈ Expla(γ ). There is s ∈min(αˆ) such that l(s) = γ . From the property P, there exists s′ such
that l(s′) = γ ′ and for all t if t ≺ s′ then t ≺ s. It follows that s′ ∈min(αˆ) and α E γ ′ . 
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The results of the previous section say that cumulative models are sound in the sense that the explanatory relation
associated to each one of them is E-cumulative (or E-S-cumulative if the model is single valued). In this section we show
the completeness of these models. An explanatory relation  is said to be representable if there is a model E such that=E .
6.1. Cumulative relations
We start with a representation theorem for cumulative explanatory relations.
Theorem 6.1. An explanatory relation  is E-cumulative iff  is represented by a cumulative model.
Proof. The if part was already shown in Proposition 5.1. For the other direction, we ﬁx an E-cumulative explanatory relation. We will deﬁne a cumulative model that represents it.
For each α ∈ FormΣ , let Ep(α) = {γ : α γ }, i.e., Ep(α) is the set of all the preferred explanations of α (with respect to). Let S be {Ep(α): α ∈ FormΣ } and l be the identity function. Finally ≺ is deﬁned as follows:
s ≺ t ⇔ ∃α∃β(s = Ep(α))&(t = Ep(β))&(α |∼ β)&(β |∼ α). (5)
Let E = 〈S, l,≺〉.
(i) The relation ≺ deﬁned by (5) is irreﬂexive and antisymmetric. In fact, from the deﬁnition of ≺ it is clear that it is
irreﬂexive. Suppose, towards a contradiction, that it is not antisymmetric. Then there are s, t ∈ S such that s ≺ t and
t ≺ s. From (5), there are α, β , α′ and β ′ such that s = Ep(α) = Ep(α′), t = Ep(β) = Ep(β ′), α  |∼ β , β |∼ α, β ′  |∼ α′
y α′ |∼ β ′ . Since Ep(α) = Ep(α′) and α′ |∼ β ′ , then α |∼ β ′ . Similarly we get β ′ |∼ α. From Proposition 3.1 we have
Ep(α) = Ep(β ′) = Ep(β), but this is impossible because α  |∼ β .
(ii) Ep(α) is the minimum of αˆ for all α in FormΣ . In particular, αˆ is smooth and not empty for all α ∈ FormΣ . Therefore
E is a cumulative model.
To see this, let α ∈ FormΣ and put t = Ep(α). Since ≺ is irreﬂexive, then t ≺ t . On the other hand, let s ∈ αˆ with s = t
and β be such that s = Ep(β). Since s ∈ αˆ, then β |∼ α. By Proposition 3.1, α  |∼ β . Thus t ≺ s and, by (i), s ≺ t .
Therefore t is the minimum of αˆ.
(iii) We will ﬁnally show that  = E . If α  γ , then γ ∈ Ep(α) and by (ii) we have Ep(α) is the minimum of αˆ and
therefore αE γ . On the other hand, suppose αE γ . Then there exists s ∈min(α˜,≺) such that γ ∈ l(s). From (ii), we
necessarily have s = Ep(α) and thus γ ∈ Ep(α). Therefore α  γ . 
Now we deal with the E-S-cumulative explanatory relations.
Theorem 6.2. An explanatory relation  is E-S-cumulative iff it is represented by a cumulative single valued l-model.
Proof. One direction was shown in Proposition 5.2. For the other direction, suppose  is E-S-cumulative. Let S be the
collection of all pairs (α,γ ) such that α  γ . Let l(α,γ ) = γ and ≺ be deﬁned on S by
(α,γ ) ≺ (β, δ) def⇔ γ 	Σ β.
We claim that E = 〈S, l,≺〉 is a cumulative l-model that represents . First of all, since  satisﬁes E-ConΣ , then αˆ is not
empty for all α ∈ FormΣ .
(i) It is straightforward that if α  γ , then (α,γ ) ∈min(αˆ,≺).
(ii) To see that αˆ is l-smooth for all α ∈ FormΣ , let (β,γ ) ∈ αˆ. If αγ , then by (i) (α,γ ) ∈min(αˆ,≺) and l(α,γ ) = l(β,γ ).
Suppose α γ . Since β  γ , then by E-S-CM α ∧ β  γ . Hence by E-C-Cut there is ρ such that α  ρ and ρ 	Σ β .
Therefore (α,ρ) ≺ (β,γ ) and (α,ρ) ∈min(αˆ,≺) by part (i).
(iii) Now we show that if (β,γ ) ∈min(αˆ,≺), then αγ . Towards a contradiction, suppose α γ . Since βγ , as before by
E-S-CM we have α ∧ βγ . By E-C-Cut, there is ρ such that αρ and ρ 	Σ β . Therefore (α,ρ) ∈ αˆ and (α,ρ) ≺ (β,γ ),
which is a contradiction.
From (i), (ii) and (iii) we conclude that E is a cumulative l-model and =E . 
6.2. Preferential relations
In this section we present a representation theorem for preferential explanatory relations, that is to say, in addition to
the postulates for E-S-cumulativity we also include LOR−. The main result is the following theorem.
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We now deﬁne a model which will be used in this and the next section. Let S be the collection of all pairs (α,γ ) such
that α  γ . Let l(α,γ ) = γ and ≺ be deﬁned on S by
(α,γ ) ≺ (β, δ) def⇔ γ 	Σ β&α ∨ β |∼ α. (6)
Let E = (S, l,≺) be the model deﬁned above. The proof of Theorem 6.3 will follow after we prove several lemmas.
Lemma 6.4. The relation ≺ deﬁned by (6) is antisymmetric.
Proof. Suppose there are (α,γ ) and (β, δ) in S such that (α,γ ) ≺ (β, δ) and (β, δ) ≺ (α,γ ). Then α ∨ β |∼ α and α ∨ β
|∼ β . By Proposition 3.2, we conclude β  γ but this is not possible, as γ 	Σ β . 
Lemma 6.5. Let be an E-S-cumulative explanatory relation satisfying SC. Then=E where E is the model deﬁned above by (6).
Moreover this model has property S and if  satisﬁes LOR−, then E has property O.
Proof. We need to show that for all α ∈ FormΣ , α γ iff there is β such that (β,γ ) ∈min(αˆ). It follows immediately from
the deﬁnition that (α,γ ) ∈min(αˆ) when αγ . Conversely, let (β,γ ) ∈min(αˆ) and, towards a contradiction, assume α γ .
Then by SC there is ρ such that α  ρ , (ρ ∨ β) ρ and ρ 	Σ β . It is clear that (ρ ∨ β,ρ) ≺ (β,γ ) which contradicts that
(β,γ ) ∈min(αˆ).
Now we verify that E has property S. In fact, let s = (θ, δ) ∈min(βˆ) with δ 	Σ α. Suppose α  δ. By SC, there is γ such
that α  γ , γ 	Σ β and (γ ∨ β) γ . Since =E , then β  δ. Then s′ = (β, δ) and t = (γ ∨ β,γ ) works.
Suppose that  satisﬁes LOR−. Using that =E , it is straightforward to verify that E has property O. 
Notice that the previous lemma does not guarantee that the model E is a cumulative model. We were able to show this
only for a ﬁnite language. However, for an arbitrary language we show it in the next section under the hypothesis of RS.
Lemma 6.6. Suppose the language is ﬁnite. Let  be an E-S-cumulative explanatory relation. Then the model E is cumulative.
Proof. Let α ∈ FormΣ and suppose, towards a contradiction, that αˆ is not smooth. Then there is (β, δ) ∈ αˆ with (β, δ) /∈
min(αˆ) and every state in αˆ below (β, δ) is not minimal in αˆ. We will construct an inﬁnite sequence of states (θi,ρi) ∈ αˆ
such that (θi,ρi) ≺ (β, δ), β 	Σ θ1, θi 	Σ θi+1 and θi+1 	Σ θi , which is impossible as the language is ﬁnite.
We start the construction. Since (β, δ) /∈min(αˆ), there is (ν,ρ1) ∈ αˆ with (ν,ρ1) ≺ (β, δ). As ν∨β |∼ ν , then ν ∨ βρ1
(by Proposition 3.2). Put θ1 = ν ∨ β , then (θ1,ρ1) ≺ (β, δ) and β 	Σ θ1.
Suppose we have deﬁned (θ1,ρ1), . . . , (θn,ρn) such that (θi,ρi) ≺ (β, δ), θi 	Σ θi+1 and θi+1 	Σ θi , for all i < n.
Since (θn,ρn) /∈ min(αˆ), there exists (ν ′, γ ′) ∈ αˆ such that (ν ′, γ ′) ≺ (θn,ρn). Put θn+1 = ν ′ ∨ θn and ρn+1 = γ ′ . Since
θn+1 |∼ ν ′ , then θn+1  γ ′ . As γ ′ 	Σ θn and β 	Σ θn , we have γ ′ 	Σ β . Thus (θn+1,ρn+1) ≺ (β, δ). Finally, as γ ′ 	Σ ν ′ ,
then θn+1 	Σ θn . 
Lemma 6.7. Let  be an E-S-cumulative explanatory relation satisfying LOR−. Then the relation deﬁned by (6) is transitive.
Proof. Suppose (α,γ ) ≺ (β, δ) y (β, δ) ≺ (η, θ). Let us prove that (α,γ ) ≺ (η, θ). We have, by deﬁnition of ≺, that α ∨ β
|∼ α, β ∨η |∼ β and γ 	Σ β . From Lemma 3.5, we have α∨η |∼ α and α∨β ∨η |∼ α. It remains to show that γ 	Σ η.
Suppose γ 	Σ η, towards a contradiction. Since α  γ , then (α ∨ β ∨ η)  γ by Proposition 3.2. By E-S-CM and LLEΣ ,
β ∨ η γ . Since β ∨ η |∼ β , then γ 	Σ β but this is impossible as (α,γ ) ≺ (β, δ). Therefore γ 	Σ η and we have shown
that (α,γ ) ≺ (η, θ). 
Proof of Theorem 6.3. The if part was proved in Proposition 5.3. The other direction follows immediately from Lemmas 6.4,
6.5, 6.6 and 6.7. 
Remark. We do not know it every E-S-cumulative explanatory relation satisfying LOR− is representable by a cumulative
single valued model. Other representation theorems are found in [8].
6.3. Relations that satisfy RS
We have seen that E-S-cumulative relations satisfying SC and LOR− are represented by transitive cumulative models but
this result was proved only for a ﬁnite language. In this section we show that under RS this can be extended to an arbitrary
language. We recall that SC and LOR− follows from RS for E-S-cumulative relations (see Proposition 2.7).
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transitive model with property P.
Proof. The if part was proved in Proposition 5.3. Conversely, suppose  is E-S-cumulative and satisﬁes RS. Let E be the
model deﬁned at the beginning of Section 6.2. By Lemma 2.7 we know that  satisﬁes LOR− and SC. Thus by Lemmas 6.4,
6.5 and 6.7, it remains to be shown that E is a cumulative model and has property P.
First we claim if α ∈ FormΣ and (β, δ) ∈ αˆ, then the following holds:
(β, δ) ∈min(αˆ) ⇔ α ∨ β |∼ β. (7)
In fact, to see (⇒) of (7), suppose α ∨ β  |∼ β . From RS, there is γ such that α ∨ β  γ , γ 	Σ α y γ 	Σ β . Thus
(α ∨ β,γ ) ≺ (β, δ) and (β, δ) /∈min(α).
For the direction (⇐) of (7), assume (β, δ) ∈ αˆ and α ∨ β |∼ β . Suppose, towards a contradiction, (β, δ) /∈min(αˆ). Then
there exists (η, θ) ∈ αˆ such that (η, θ) ≺ (β, δ). Then η ∨ β |∼ η and θ 	Σ β . By Proposition 3.2 and Lemma 3.5, we have
α ∨ β ∨ η θ . Notice that θ 	Σ α ∨ β , then α ∨ β  θ by E-S-CM and LLEΣ . Finally, as α ∨ β |∼ β , then θ 	Σ β but this
is impossible because (η, θ) ≺ (β, δ).
We show now that E is cumulative. Let α ∈ FormΣ . Since  satisﬁes E-ConΣ , then αˆ is not empty. Let (β, δ) ∈ αˆ. If
(β, δ) /∈min(αˆ), then by (7) we have α ∨ β  |∼ β . Then there is δ such that α ∨ β  δ and δ 	Σ β . Let γ = δ ∧α ∧¬β , from
RS we have (α ∨ β) γ . Moreover, γ 	Σ α and γ 	Σ β . Thus (α ∨ β,γ ) ≺ (β, δ) and from (7) it follows that (α ∨ β,γ ) ∈
min(αˆ).
We ﬁnally show that E satisﬁes P. Let s = (α, δ) ∈ S and γ ∈ Expla(l(s)). By RS we have that α  γ . Let s′ = (α,γ ) ∈ S ,
then l(s′) = γ . If (ρ, θ) ≺ (α,γ ), then (ρ, θ) ≺ (α, δ) from the deﬁnition of ≺. 
6.4. Injective representation
We end this section by putting some of the results from [22] in the present context of cumulative models. To each
preference relation ≺ over FormΣ is associated an explanatory relation ≺ as follows:
α ≺ γ def⇔ γ ∈min(Expla(α),≺).
We say that ≺ is smooth, if Expla(α) is smooth with respect to ≺ (as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 4.3) for every α ∈ FormΣ .
The problem of characterizing the explanatory relations of the form ≺ was the main issue studied in [22]. For that end, a
preference relation ≺e over FormΣ was associated to each explanatory relation  as follows. Let γ be an admissible formula
(i.e. α  γ for some α ∈ FormΣ ) and δ ∈ FormΣ , then
γ ≺e δ def⇔ ∀α (α  δ ⇒ γ 	Σ α).
Our next result says that the problem studied in [22] corresponds to the problem of characterizing explanatory relations
with an injective representation.
Theorem 6.9. Let  be an explanatory relation. Then  is represented by a single valued cumulative model E = 〈S, l,≺〉 with l
injective iff ≺e is smooth and =≺e .
Proof. Suppose that ≺e is smooth and =≺e . Let S = FormΣ and l(γ ) = γ , then E = 〈S, l,≺〉 is a single valued injective
model. It is routine to verify that =E .
Now suppose  is represented by a single valued cumulative model E = 〈S, l,≺〉 with l injective. Deﬁne a preference
relation ≺∗ over FormΣ as follows: δ ≺∗ γ if either δ = l(s), γ = l(t) and s ≺ t or δ is in the range of l and γ is not. It is
routine to verify that ≺∗ is a smooth preference relation and =≺∗ . Now the result follows from [22, Proposition 5.8]. 
Example 6.10 (An explanatory relation not admitting an injective representation). There are four states s1, s2, s3 and s4 and the
preference among them is indicated below:
s2 s4
| |
s1 s3
Let the language be ﬁnite with at least 3 different valuations M , N and P . Let γM , γN and γP be formulas each one with
only one model, M , N and P respectively. Let l(s1) = γM , l(s2) = l(s4) = γN and l(s3) = γP . It is easy to verify that this model
is cumulative. Let  be the explanatory relation associated to this model. Then  cannot be represented by an injective
single valued cumulative l-model. In fact, let E = (T ,m,) be any single valued cumulative l-model such that E = .
Let α = γM ∨ γN and β = γP ∨ γN . Then it is not diﬃcult to show that there is s ∈ min(αˆ,) and t ∈ min(βˆ,) such that
m(s) =m(t) and s = t .
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terms of postulates like LOR, E-R-Cut and ROR (see [22] for the deﬁnition of these postulates). In this paper we obtain
representation theorems for E-cumulative relations without assuming any of those postulates and, in the general case, the
models we construct are not injective. However, we do not know a characterization (in terms of postulates) of explanatory
relations representable by injective models. The analogous question for consequence relations turned out to be diﬃcult (see
[13,21,24,25]).
7. Consequence relations versus explanatory relations
As we said in the introduction, it is natural to wonder about the possibility of reducing the representation of an explana-
tory relation to that of its associate consequence relation |∼ and viceversa. In this section we make some comments about
this issue.
On the one hand, as we already showed in Section 3.4, the map  → |∼ is not injective and thus we cannot expect,
in general, to get a model for  from a model for |∼ . Even in the case when  is causal (i.e. when (Φ ◦ Ψ )() =) we
do not know a direct way for transforming a KLM model of |∼ into a model of |∼ . Even though the proof of Theorem 6.8
is similar to the proof of the representation theorem for preferential consequence relations as given in [16], our results do
not seem to be a corollary of those in [16].
On the other hand, we now show that our representation theorems for explanatory relations provide a way of represent-
ing preferential consequence relations in the KLM sense. However, our result seems weaker than the corresponding KLM
theorem, since the model we get is only cumulative.
To each single valued cumulative model E = 〈S, l,≺〉 we associate a KLM model as follows: Let M = (S, i,≺) where
i(s) = mod(Σ ∪ {l(s)}) for each s ∈ S . Then M is a cumulative model in the KLM sense and clearly |∼E is exactly the
consequence relation associate to M. We recall that |∼E was deﬁned by:
α |∼E θ def⇔ ∀s ∈min(αˆ)
(
l(s) 	Σ θ
)
.
Also notice that
|∼E = |∼E .
Theorem 7.1. Let |∼ be a consequence relation adequate with respect toΣ . Then |∼ is preferential iff there is a single valued cumulative
transitive model E = 〈S, l,≺〉 with property P such that |∼ = |∼E .
Proof. (i) Suppose |∼ is preferential. Then |∼ is E-S-cumulative and satisﬁes RS. Therefore by Theorem 6.8 there is a single
valued cumulative transitive model E = 〈S, l,≺〉 with property P such that |∼ =E and from this it is easy to verify that
|∼ = |∼E (this is just the fact that |∼ is a causal relation).
(ii) Let E = 〈S, l,≺〉 be a single valued cumulative transitive model with property P and |∼ = |∼E . By part (iii) of
Proposition 5.3 we have that E satisﬁes RS and thus E is preferential by Lemma 2.7. By part (ii) of Theorem 3.4, |∼E
is preferential. Since |∼E = |∼E then |∼ is preferential. 
8. Final comments
We have presented several representation theorems which are summarized in the following table:
 Model |∼
E-cumulative cumulative model cumulative
E-S-cumulative cumulative single valued l-model cumulative
E-preferential+ SC + Finite Language cumulative single valued model+ O+ S preferential
E-S-cumulative+ RS cumulative single valued model+ P preferential
These results reﬂect a duality between explanatory relations and consequence relations. The duality is given by the
maps  → |∼ and |∼ → |∼ . These maps preserve the structural properties but do not provide a reduction between
explanatory and consequence relations. In fact, there are different explanatory relations such that their corresponding ab-
ductive consequence relations are the same, thus when we move from  to |∼ the actual explanations can be lost. On the
other hand, we have derived from our results a representation theorem (in the sense of KLM) for preferential consequence
relations. All these facts seem to indicate that the notion of an explanatory relation is more basic than the notion of a
consequence relation.
We have introduced the new notion of a cumulative l-model where the smoothness condition depends on both the
preference relation and the labeling function. We have shown that this more general notion is necessary for representing
some E-cumulative explanatory relations. As one of the referees suggested, it is an open question whether the l-models can
served to represent an interesting class of consequence relations (in [9] was analyzed a related problem.)
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planatory reasoning (at least for the type studied in this paper)? For the most general case, our representation theorems
are in terms of sets of formulas which cannot be assumed to be deductively closed. Hence those theorems cannot be, in
general, presented in terms of valuations. This is not surprising, as we cannot expect to represent an arbitrary explanatory
relation purely in terms of valuations because, in general, explanatory relations are not syntax independent as they might
not satisfy RLEΣ . Nevertheless, our theorems provide a representation of an explanatory relation in terms of a preferential
structure that uses sets of formulas instead of valuations.
Some of the postulates for explanatory reasoning are really properties about an inference process involving two relations: and |∼. The ﬁrst relation encodes how an agent explains an observation and the second one says what else the agent
expects to hold in the particular situation under observation. For example, we can rewrite E-CM and E-C-Cut, respectively,
as follows:
If α  γ and α |∼β, then (α ∧ β) γ
If (α ∧ β) γ and α |∼β, then α  γ
From this perspective, in order to make the connection between  and |∼ more tight, it would be convenient to add
some extra axioms. For instance, we have already encountered in Section 2.3 the following postulate:
If α  γ , then γ |∼α.
The advantages and scope of this approach based on two relations is an open problem.
We want to recall another open question left in [20]. We have worked with properties related to a ﬁxed background
theory. However, in the more general situation, explanatory reasoning can be regarded as a process with three parameters:
an observation, an explanation and a background theory [1,7]. Thus it would be interesting to develop a theory that can
deal with observations that may lead to a revision of the background theory.
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